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MORALITY AND CAPITALISM 







                     1. INTRODUCTION 
          In thinking about the role of morality in economic life I propose to use an analytical framework 
I developed in my Unintended Consequences (Lal (1998), which is somewhat different from the one 
presented by John Dunning in the first chapter. At the same time it will seek to pose and answer some 
of the questions he has raised concerning the role of morality and global capitalism. This framework 
is presented in Part I. From this, I provide a highly condensed account of the role of morality in 
economic life from the Stone Age to the present. In particular I shall emphasize the Great Divergence 
that took place among the leading Eurasian civilizations in the high Middle Ages because of two 
Papal Revolutions which replaced the communalist ethic, common to most of the agrarian Eurasian 
civilizations, by individualism in Western Christendom, first in family affairs and then in thought 
and action. This is the theme of Part II. These provide an obvious point of departure for the 
discussion in Part III of the differences in the ethics of the great civilizations down to our own day, 
and the strange course that Western individualism has taken over the last two hundred years. In 
doing so, I hope it will be possible to examine whether or not a global morality is needed for global 
capitalism to thrive and if it is what form it should take. Part IV relates my conclusions to the role of 
the four institutions of global capitalism identified by Dunning- markets, governments, NGO's and 
supra national authorities- in fostering global capitalism. In doing so, while I accept Dunning's 
distinctions between globalization, the global market place and global capitalism, I intend to use a 
somewhat narrower definition of the latter – which roughly corresponds to what has been called  
(sometimes  derisively) the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism. 
         
                          
                       2.  ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
             
    From an economist’s perspective morality is best looked upon as part of the institutional 
infrastructure of a society. This  institutional infrastructure, broadly defined, consists of informal 
constraints like cultural norms (which encompass morality) and the more  formal ones which 
are`embodied in particular and more purposeful organizational structures. Inter alia such formal 
rules embrace the Common Law which forms a spontaneous order in Hayek's sense as having 
evolved without any conscious design 
- which constrain human behavior.  
      But as soon as we talk about constraining human behavior we are implicitly acknowledging that 
there is some basic "human nature" to be constrained. While we take up this question in greater 
detail below, as a first cut we can accept the economists model of "Homo Economicus" which 
assumes that human beings are both rational and motivated purely by self interest: maximizing 
utility as consumers and profits as producers. So as a start, the function of the rules constraining 
human nature which comprise institutions must be to limit such self-seeking behavior.  
       This immediately points to another significant feature and reason for the existence of institutions. 
If Robinson Crusoe was alone on his island he would have no reason to constrain his basic human 
nature. It is only with the appearance of Man Friday that some constraints on both him and Crusoe 
might be necessary for them to co-operate in order to increase their mutual gains: and to do so  by 
specializing in tasks in which each has a comparative advantage.  This, then immediately leads us to 
the notion of "transactions costs"- a concept which is even more slippery than that of institutions. 
         The reason why there is a close relation between institutions and transactions costs is that, as 
Robin Matthews pointed out several years ago, "to a large extent transactions costs are costs of 
relations between people", 
 and institutions are par excellence ways of controlling or influencing the form, content and outcome  
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of  these interactions.  
          Culture is the informal aspect of institutions which constrain human behaviour. But if 
'institutions' are a murky concept, 'culture' is even more so. I have found an interpretation adopted 
by ecologists particularly useful.  They emphasize that, unlike other animals, the human being is 
unique because of  its intelligence  and motiation to change its environment by learning. It does not 
have to mutate into a new species to adapt to the changed environment. It learns new ways of 
surviving in the new environment and then fixes them by social custom. These social customs form 
the culture of the relevant group, which are then transmitted to new members of the group (mainly 
children) who do not then have to invent these 'new' ways de novo for themselves.  
            This definition of culture fits in well with the economists notion of equilibrium. Frank Hahn 
has 
 described an equilibrium state as one where self  seeking agents learn nothing new so that their 
behavior is routinized. It represents an adaptation by agents to the economic environment in which 
the economy "generates messages which do not cause agents to change the theories which they hold 
or the policies which they pursue." (Hahn (1973),p.28). This routinized behavior is clearly close to 
the ecologist’s notion of social custom which fixes a particular human niche. On this view, the 
equilibrium will be disturbed if the environment changes, and so, in the subsequent process of 
adjustment, the human agents will have to abandon their past theories, which would now have been  
falsified. To survive, they must learn to adapt to their new environment through a process of trial 
and error. There will then be a new social equilibrium, which relates to a state of society and 
economy in which "agents have adapted themselves to their economic environment and where their 
expectations in the widest sense are in the proper meaning not falsified". (Hahn, ibid) 
       This equilibrium need not be unique nor optimal, given the environmental parameters. But once 
a particular socio-economic order is established, and is proved to be an adequate adaptation to the 
new environment, it is likely to be stable, as there is no reason for the human agents to alter it in any 
fundamental manner, unless and until the environmental parameters are altered. Nor is this social 
order likely to be the result of a deliberate rationalist plan. We have known since Adam Smith that it 
is possible for an unplanned but coherent and seemingly planned social system  to emerge from the 
independent actions of many individuals pursuing their different ends, and which lead to final 
outcomes very different from those intended. 
         Here it maybe useful to  distinguish between two major sorts of beliefs relating to different 
aspects of the environment. These are the material and cosmological beliefs of a particular culture. 
The former relate to ways of making a living ,and  beliefs about the material world, in particular 
about the economy. The latter  relates to our understanding of the world around us and mankind's 
place in it; which, in turn, determine how people view the  purpose and , meaning of their lives and 
inter personal relationships.. There is considerable cross-cultural evidence that material beliefs are 
more malleable than cosmological ones. Material beliefs can respond rapidly to changes in the 
material environment. There is greater hysterisis in cosmological beliefs, on how, in Plato's words, 
"one should live". Moreover the cross-cultural evidence shows that rather than the environment it is 
the language group to which people belong that influences these world-views. 
         This distinction between material and cosmological beliefs is important for economic 
performance because it translates into two distinct types of  transactions costs which are of 
importance in explaining not only 'market' but also 'government or bureaucratic failure'.  Broadly 
speaking transactions costs can usefully be distinguished between  those associated with the efficiency 
of exchange, and those  associated with policing opportunistic behavior by economic agents.  The 
former relate to the costs of finding potential trading partners and determining their supply- demand 
offers, and the latter to enforcing the execution of promises and agreements.  
         These two types of transactions need to be kept distinct from each other. The economic 
historian Douglass North (1990) and the industrial organization and institutionalist theorist Oliver 
Williamson (1985) have both evoked the notion of transactions costs, and used them to explain 
various institutional arrangements relevant for economic performance. While both are primarily 
concerned with the costs of opportunistic behavior, to  North these arise as a result of the more 
idiosyncratic  and  non-repeated transactions accompanying the widening of the market, to 
Williamson they stem from the asymmetries in information facing principals and agents, in cases 
where crucial characteristics of the agent relevant for measuring performance can be concealed from 
the principal. Both these are cases where it is the policing aspects of transactions costs which are at  
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issue, not those concerning exchange.  
   To see the relevance of the distinction in beliefs and that in transactions costs for economic 
performance, it is useful to briefly delineate how material and cosmological beliefs have altered since 
the Stone Age in Eurasia.  
   
 
            3.CHANGING MATERIAL AND COSMOLOGICAL BELIEFS 
    
 3.1 On Human Nature: 
        Evolutionary anthropologists and psychologists maintain that human nature was set during the 
period of evolution ending with the Stone Age. Since then, there has not been sufficient time for any 
further evolution. This concept of human nature appears darker than Rousseau's and brighter than 
Hobbes' characterizations of it. It is closer to Hume's view that " there is some benevolence, however 
small...some particle of the dove kneaded into our frame, along with the elements of the wolf and 
serpent." (Hobbes (        ) p. )For even the hunter gatherer of the Stone age  would have found some 
form of what evolutionary biologists term "reciprocal altruism" to his own benefit. He would have 
discovered that in various tasks he had to pursue, co-operation with one's fellows yielded gains  for 
him which might  be further increased if he could cheat and be a free rider. In the repeated 
interactions between the selfish humans comprising the tribe, such cheating could be mitigated by 
playing the game of "tit for tat". Evolutionary biologists claim that the resulting  "reciprocal 
altruism" was part of our basic human nature in the Stone Age. 
         Archaeologists have also established that the instinct to "truck and barter", the trading instinct 
based on what Sir John Hicks used to call the "economic principle" - "people would act 
economically; when an opportunity of an advantage was presented to them they would take it" 
(Hicks (1979) p.43) 
- is also of Stone Age vintage. It is also part of our basic human nature.  
 
     3.2 Agrarian Civilizations: 
     With the rise of settled agriculture and the civilizations that evolved around them, however, and 
the stratification this involved between three classes of men - those wielding respectively the sword, 
the pen and the plough- most of the basic instincts which comprised our human nature in the Stone  
Age would be dysfunctional. Thus with the multiplication of interactions between human beings in 
agrarian civilizations, many of the transactions would have been with anonymous strangers who 
might never be seen again. The "reciprocal altruism" of the Stone Age which depended upon a 
repetition of transactions would not be sufficient to curtail opportunistic behavior.  
        Putting it differently, the 'tit for tat' strategy for the repeated Prisoners Dilemma (PD) game 
among a band of hunter-gatherers in the Stone Age would not suffice with the increased number of 
one-shot  games consequential upon the arrival of  settled agriculture, and the widening of the 
market for its output. To prevent the resulting dissipation of the mutual gains from co-operation, 
agrarian civilizations internalized restraints on such 'anti-social' action through moral codes which 
were part of their 'religion'. But these 'religions' were more ways of life as they did not necessarily 
depend upon a belief in God.  
       The universal moral emotions of shame and guilt are the means by which these 'moral codes' 
embodied in cultural traditions are internalized in the socialization process during infancy. Shame 
was the major instrument of this internalization in the great agrarian civilizations. Their resulting 
cosmological beliefs can be described as being 'communalist'. 
         The basic human instinct to trade would also be disruptive for settled agriculture. For traders 
are motivated by instrumental rationality which maximizes economic advantage. This would threaten 
the communal bonds that all agrarian civilizations have tried to foster. Not surprisingly most of them 
have looked upon merchants and markets as a necessary evil, and sought to suppress them and the 
market which is their institutional embodiment. The material beliefs of the agrarian civilizations 
were thus not conducive to modern economic growth whose major institutions can be summed up as 
capitalism. 
3.3 The Rise of the West:           
       The great divergence of Western Europe from the other Eurasian civilizations occurred, I have 
argued in UC, because of a change in the cosmological and material beliefs  mediated by the Catholic  
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Church in the 6th-11th centuries, through its promotion of individualism, first in family affairs and 
later in material relationships. The first were a series of  pronouncements by Pope Gregory I in the 
6
th century on family matters (see Goody (1983), and the second those by Gregory VII in the 11
th 
century on property and institutionally related issues (see Berman (1983). These can be called the 
twin Papal revolutions of which Gregory VII’s  in the 11
th century included the introduction of all the 
legal and institutional requirements of a market economy, which eventually put the West on a 
different economic trajcetory than its Eurasian peers. . 
  
         These twin Papal revolutions arose because of the unintended consequences of the Church's 
search for bequests- a trait that goes back to its earliest days. From its inception it had grown as a 
temporal power through gifts and donations -particularly from rich widows. So much so that, in July 
370 the Emperor Valentinian had addressed a ruling to the Pope that male clerics and  unmarried 
ascetics should not hang around the houses of women and widows and try to worm themselves and 
their churches into their bequests at the expense of the women's families and blood relations. From 
its very beginnings then the Church was in the race for inheritances. In this respect, the early 
Church's extolling of virginity and preventing second marriages helped it in creating more single 
women who would leave bequests to the Church. 
         This process of inhibiting a family from retaining its property and promoting its alienation, 
accelerated with the answers that Pope Gregory I gave to some questions that the first Archbishop of 
Canterbury, Augustine, had sent in 597 concerning his new charges. Four of these nine   concerned 
issues related to sex and marriage. Gregory's answers overturned the traditional Mediterranean and 
Middle Eastern patterns of legal and customary practices in the domestic domain. The traditional 
system was concerned with the provision of an heir to inherit family property, and allowed marriage 
to close kin, marriages to close affines or widows of close kin, the transfer of children by adoption , 
and finally concubinage, which is a form of secondary union. Gregory banned all four practices. 
There was for instance, no adoption of children allowed in England until the 19th century. There was 
no basis for these injunctions in Scripture, Roman law or the existing customs in the areas that were 
Christianised. 
            This Papal family revolution made the Church unbelievably rich. Demographers have 
estimated that the net effect of the prohibitions on traditional methods to deal with childlessness was 
to leave 40 per cent of families with no immediate male heirs. The Church became the chief 
beneficiary of the resulting bequests. Its accumulation was phenomenal. In France , for instance, it is 
estimat4ed that one third of productive land was in ecclesiastical hands by the end of the 7th century! 
(see Goody (1983))  
            But this accumulation also drew predators from within and without the Church  to deprive it 
of its acquired property. It was to deal with this denudation that Pope Gregory VII instigated his 
Papal revolution in 1075, by putting the power of God - through the spiritual weapon of 
excommunication-above that of Caesar's. With the Church then entering  into the realm of the world, 
the new Church-state also created  the whole administrative and legal paraphernalia which we 
associate with a modern polity. This provided the essential institutional infrastructure for the 
Western dynamic that was in time led to Promethean growth.
1 Thus Pope Gregory VII's Papal 
revolution lifted the lid on the basic human instinct to 'truck and barter', and in time to a change in 
the traditional Eurasian pattern of material beliefs with their suspicion of markets and merchants. 
This in time led to modern economic growth. 
           But the first Papal Revolution of Gregory the Great also led to a change in the traditional 
Eurasian family patterns which were based on various forms of 'joint families' and family values. 
This essentially removed the lid placed on the other opportunistic basic instincts by  the shame based 
                                                 
1 I distinguish in UC between two types of intensive growth: Smithian and Promethean. Intensive 
growth is a sustained rise in per capita income as contrasted with extensive growth where output 
keeps pace with population so that per capita income is constant. In traditional agrarian economies 
intensive growth occurred normally when a new Empire linked previously autarkic regions into a 
common economic space giving rise to the gains from trade and specialization and consequently a rise 
in per capita income as emphasized by Adam Smith. With the Industrial Revolution based on 




moral codes of Eurasia. To counter the potential threat this posed to its way of making a living by 
way of  settled agriculture, the Church created a fierce guilt culture in which the concept of  Original 
Sin was paramount, and morality was underwritten by the belief in the Christian God. (see 
Delumeau (1990)) 
          
       
 
                  4. COMMUNALISM VERSUS INDIVIDUALISM 
         Of the major Eurasian civilizations, the ethic of the Sinic (and its derivatives in Japan and 
Korea) and the Hindu, has remained  distinctly 'communalist' rather than individualist for millenia. 
But there were important differences in the cosmological beliefs of these two ancient civilizations.  
      4.1 Hindu Civilization: 
     The ancient Hindu unlike the Sinic civilization did have a role for a form of individualism, which 
was reminiscent of that found among the Greek Stoics. The anthropologist Louis Dumont has 
labelled this as "out-worldly" individualism as contrasted with the "in-worldly" individualism, which 
is the hallmark of the 'modern' individual. Hinduism allows the person who renounces the world and 
becomes an ascetic to pursue his own personal salvation without any concern for the social world. 
Like the Greek Stoic this Hindu "renouncer is self-sufficient, concerned only with himself. His 
thought is similar to the that of the modern individual, but for one basic difference: we live in the 
social world, he lives outside it".  (Dumont (1986), p.26) 
         For a Hindu, who had not renounced the social world, Western individualism is impossible as 
Ernest Gellner tellingly puts it, by imagining a Hindu Robinson Crusoe, a polyglot called Robinson 
Chatterjee. "A Hindu Crusoe" he notes "would be a contradiction. He would be destined for 
perpetual pollution: if a priest, then his isolation and forced self-sufficiency would oblige him to 
perform demeaning and polluting acts. If not a priest, he would be doomed through his inability to 
perform the obligatory rituals". (Gellner (1983) p.121) 
  
      4.2 Sinic Civilization: 
       The ancient Sinic civilization did not even have this "out-worldly" individualism of the Hindus 
and the Greeks. Its central cosmological beliefs have been summarized as its optimism, its familialism 
and its bureaucratic authoritarianism. (see Hallpike (1986), Jenner (1992)). Interacting and 
influencing these characteristics were the embedded customs of  "ancestor worship and its social and 
political correlates involving hierarchy, ritual deference, obedience and reciprocity". (Keightely 
(1990),p. 45).  There is little room for even the "out-worldly" individualism of the Hindus or Greeks 
in these cosmological views which have been labelled "Confucianism"; this in spite of the continuing 
controversy over whether the ancient sage should be lumbered with whatever have been seen to be 
the distinctive features of Chinese civilization.  
           In our own day and age, partly provoked by the events surrounding Tianenmen Square, there 
has been an attempt to reconcile "Confucianism" with Western notions of "human rights". (see De 
Bary (1998), De Bary and Tu Weiming (1998).  But apart from the murkiness surrounding the notion 
of "rights" even within the Western philosophical tradition  As  Henry Rosemont 
 rightly notes:  within the Confucian framework " rights-talk was not spoken, and within which I am 
not a free, autonomous individual. I am a son, husband, father, grandfather, neighbor, colleague, 
student, teacher, citizen, friend. I have a very large number of relational obligations and 
responsibilities, which severely constrain what I do. These responsibilities occasionally frustrate or 
annoy, they more often are satisfying and they are always binding...And my individuality, if anyone 
wishes to keep the concept, will come from the specific actions I take in meeting my relational 
responsibilities". (Rosemont (1998),p.63) 
            As he rightly notes, the attempt to reconcile a different "way to live" with the universal claims 
of Christianity has been a constant factor in the West's encounter with China. Views differed 
between  those who thought the Chinese way was incompatible with universal Christian beliefs 
seeking conversion, and  others- of a less imperialist bent- sought ways of making Chinese beliefs fit 
the universal Christian ethic.  
      
    4.3 Christianity: 
             In this context it is worth noting the important difference between  the cosmological beliefs of  
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what became the Christian West and the other ancient agrarian civilizations of Eurasia. Christianity 
has a number of distinctive features which it shares with its Semitic cousin Islam, but, in part, with 
its parent Judaism, but which are not to be found in any of the other great Eurasian religions. First 
and  most important is its universality. Neither the Jews, nor the Hindu or Sinic civilizations had 
religions claiming to be universal. You could not choose to be a Hindu, Chinese or Jew, you were 
born as one. Second, this also meant that, unlike Christianity and Islam these religions did not 
prosletyise. Third, only the Semitic monotheistic religions  have also been egalitarian. Nearly all the 
other Eurasian religions  believed in some form of hierarchical social order. By contrast alone among 
the Eurasian civilizations the Semitic ones (though least so the Jewish) emphasized the equality of 
men's souls. Dumont (1970)  has rightly characterized the resulting and profound divide between the 
societies of Homo Aequalis which believe all men are born equal (as the philosophes, and the 
American constitution proclaim) and those of Homo Hierarchicus which believe no such thing. 
         Thus Christianity, as we shall see, is and remains at the nub of the West's beliefs, and at the 
heart of that 'clash of civilizations' posited by Huntington. There can be little doubt that neither the 
Hindu nor the Sinic civilizations have adhered to the Western notions of liberty and equality based 
on individualism. 
           But, neither did the West, for a long time. For though Christianity came inadvertently to 
promote the "in-worldly" individualism which is a hallmark of Western civilization, in its basic 
teachings it did not differ greatly from the communalism found in the other great ethical beliefs 
systems of the Ancient world. Like the Greeks and the Hindus it provided a place for "out-worldy" 
individualism. As Dumont notes :" there is no doubt about the fundamental conception of man that 
flowed from the teaching of Christ...man is an individual in-relation-to God; ..this means that man is 
in essence an out-worldly individual".(Dumont (1986),p.27). 
            It was St.Augustine  in his   City of God, who  by substituting the absolute submission of the 
State to the Church for the previous endorsement of sacral kingship, analogous to the Hindus,  
brought the Church 'into the world' with Gregory VII's proclamation :"Let the terrestrial kingdom 
serve- or be the slave- of the celestial".                 
 
   4.4 The Course of Western Individualism: 
              But the course of individualism has not been simple in the West. It would take me too far 
afield to go into this in detail, but the importance of St. Augustine's "City of God" must be noted. 
Throughout the last millennium the West has been haunted by its cosmology. From the 
Enlightenment to Marxism to Freudianism to Eco-fundamentalism , Augustine's vision of the 
Heavenly City has had a tenacious hold on the Western mind. The same narrative with a Garden of 
Eden, a Fall leading to Original Sin and a Day of Judgment keeps recurring. Thus the 18
th century  
philosophers of the Enlightenment in their refurbishment of Augustine,  displaced the Garden of 
Eden by classical Greece and Rome, and God became an abstract cause-the Divine Watchmaker. The 
Christian centuries were now taken to be the Fall, with  the Christian revelations considered  a fraud 
as for the enlightened  God expressed his purpose through his laws recorded in the Great Book of 
Nature. The Enlightened were the elect and the Christian paradise was replaced by Posterity .  By 
this reconfiguration of the Christian narrative the 18th century philosophers of the Enlightenment 
thought they had been able to salvage a basis for morality and social order in the world of the Divine 
Watchmaker. But once, as a result of Darwin, he was seen to be blind, as Nietzsche proclaimed from 
the housetops at the end of the 19th century, God was Dead, and the moral foundations of the West 
were thereafter in ruins.  
   The subsequent attempts to found a morality based on reason are open to Freidriech Nietzsche's 
fatal objection in his aphorism about utilitarianism. He wrote: "moral sensibilities are nowadays at 
such cross purposes that to one man a morality is proved by its utility, while to another its utility 
refutes it"(Nietzsche(1881/1982)p.220) . 
 Nietzsche's greatness lies in his clear recognition of  the moral abyss that the death of its God had 
created for the West. Kant's attempt to ground a rational morality on the principle of 
universalisability- harking back to the Biblical injunction "therefore all things whatsoever ye do 
would that men should do to you, do even so to them"- founders on Hegel's two objections: it first is 
merely a principle of logical consistency without any specific moral content, and second  as a result it 
is powerless to prevent any immoral conduct that takes our fancy. The subsequent ink spilt by moral 
philosophers has merely clothed their particular prejudices in rational form.            
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              The death of the Christian God did not, however, end variations on the theme of Augustine's 
"City". It was to go through two further mutations in the form of Marxism and Freudianism, and a 
more recent and bizarre mutation in the form of Ecofundamentalism.
2 
     Marxism like the Christian  faith looks to the past and the future. There is a counterpart to the 
Garden of Eden , i.e the time  before "property" relations corrupted "natural man". The following  
Fall is best regarded as "commodification" which leads to a class society and a continuing but 
impersonal conflict of material forces. This in turn leads  to the Day of Judgment with the Revolution 
and the millennial Paradise of Communism. Marx alsoclaimed that this  movement towards earthly 
salvation was mediated, not as the Enlightenment sages had claimed through enlightenment and the 
preaching of good will, but by the inexorable forces of historical materialism. Another secular "city 
of God" has been created. 
      Ecofundamentalism is the latest of these secular mutations of Augustine's "City of God" (see Lal 
(1995)). . It carries the Christian notion of contemptus mundi to its logical conclusion. Humankind is 
evil, and only by living in harmony with a deified Nature can it be saved. 
       The West's current cosmological beliefs, inadequately summarized by the word 'liberty' are thus, 
at present, incoherent.  As the philosopher Alasdair Macintyre has powerfully argued, the current 
Western notion of self has three contradictory elements. 
 The first, derives from the Enlightenment. It  views individuals  as being able to stand apart from the 
external social influences and constraints, and allows them  to mould themselves in accordance with 
their own true preferences. The second component of the Western self concerns the evaluation of 
oneself  by others  Here the standards are increasingly those of acquisitive and competitive success, 
as  nurtured (so some would believe) by a bureaucratized and individualist market economy. The 
third element of the Western self derives from its remaining religious and moral norms, and is open 
to various "invocations of values as various as those which inform the public rhetoric of politics on 
the one hand and the success of Habits of the Heart on the other"(Macintyre ( 1990) p.492). This 
aspect of the self harks back to the Christian conception of the soul, and its transcendental salvation.  
    These three elements comprising the Western conception of self are not only mutually 
incompatabile, they are incommensurable.  They also lead to incoherence as there are no shared 
standards by which the inevitable conflicts between them can be resolved. So as Acintyre puts it  
“rights based claims, utility-based claims, contractarian claims, and claims based upon this or that 
ideal conception of the good will be advanced in different contexts, with relatively little discomfort at 
the incoherence involved. For unacknowledged incoherence is the hallmark of this contemporary 
developing American self, a self whose public voice oscillates between phases not merely of toleration, 
but admiration for ruthlessly self-serving behavior and phases of high moral dudgeon and 
indignation at exactly the same behavior" (p.492). 
            Many in the West can be seen as going back to the worship of the multiplicity of 'gods' and 
personal moral codes (particularly in the realm of sexuality)  which are reminiscent of the pre-
Christian Graeco-Roman world. The growing  popularity of "New Age" religions which is occurring 
at a time  the traditional Churches continue to lose followers is a testament to the growing 'neo-
paganism' in the West. 
In the ensuing plethora of moral beliefs -particularly in a cross-cultural context- it is a brave soul 
who would be able to find any basis for a universal ethic. But if Reason or a universally acceptable 
God cannot provide us with a common basis for morality, and if- as we have seen- morality is needed 
to reduce the 'policing' type of transactions costs for economic efficiency, on what basis are we to 
found this morality? 
          Here it is interesting to re-examine David  Hume’s views of two and a half centuries ago.  In  
his “Treatise of Human Nature” (1740/1985) , he begins by recognizing morality is essential to 
control man's self-aggrandizing instincts to garner the gains from co-operation. However,  he does 
not try to ground morality either in a belief in God or reason but rather in tradition. As he notes: 
"the sense of justice and injustice is not derived from nature, but arises artificially, tho' necessarily 
from education and human conventions" (p.535). Once they are in place " a sympathy with public 
interest is the source of moral approbation, which attends that virtue [justice]" (p.551). This leads 
parents "to inculcate in their children from the earliest infancy, the principles of probity, and teach 
                                                 
2 That Freudianism follows the same Augustinian narrative is show in Gellner (1993), Webster 
(1995).   
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them to regard the observance of those rules by which society is maintained as worthy and 
honorable, and their violation as base and infamous" (ibid). Hume while clearly accepting  the role of 
morality in maintaining the social cement of society, believes that this morality is primarily 
dependent on a society's traditions and forms of socialization. Neither God nor Reason needs to be 
evoked  to justify these conditioned and necessary habits. This is very much the view of ethics taken 
by the older Eurasian civilizations with their moral ecology based on  shame. 
          Given the multiplicity of ethical traditions, does it matter for the economy if there is no 
common agreement about the content of morality, as long as each society  has its own morality to 
constrain immoral behaviour? At least I have argued elsewhere (Lal (1998)) that although in the rise 
of the West the change in cosmological and material beliefs were conjoined, this is not necessary once 
the legal and other infrastructure for a market and commercial society were created by Gregory 
VII's 11th century Papal revolution. The Rest of the world has the option- as dramatically illustrated 
by the Japanese example of adopting the West's material beliefs which are necessary for prosperity, 
without adopting the West's cosmological belief's and surrendering itsown moral ecology. In short, it 
is possible  to modernise without Westernising.  
           Nor, as Adam Smith showed so effectively in “The Wealth of Nations” (Smith  1776/ 1991), 
does a  market economy have to depend upon the scarce virtues- like benevolence (which for Smith in 
“The Theory of Moral Sentiments” was the highest virtue)- for its efficient functioning. It only 
requires a vast number of people to deal and live together, even if they have no personal 
relationships, as long as they do not violate the 'laws of justice'. The resulting commercial society 
promotes some virtues (what Shirley Letwin (1992) has labelled the 'vigorous virtues )- such as hard 
work, prudence, thrift and self-reliance. As these virtues directly benefit the economic agents in 
commercial society, and only indirectly benefit others, they are inferior to altruism. But by 
promoting general prosperity, these lower level virtues “(what John Dunning calls proper selfishness) 
 do unintentionally help others. Hence, it maybe argued,  the resulting commercial or capitalist 
society is neither immoral or amoral. 
               
          5. IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 
             What implications does all this have for global capitalism?  A major implication as I see it is 
that, in a global context many of the ethical complaints against capitalism are misdirected. In many 
cases they are atavistic, harking back to the material beliefs of the old agrarian civilizations. One 
important example which has contemporary resonance in the common complaints made against the 
global capital market will have to suffice. (see Lal (1985)) 
  
 5.1 Markets: 
     Economic historians consider the creation of the national public debt and the Bank of England 
soon after the ‘Glorious Revolution’  in England in the late 17th century as an essential element in 
the rise in economic power and social status of the merchant and financier from the 16th to 18th 
centuries. This rise, however, posed severe problems for the prevailing  'Aristotelian' ethical beliefs of 
these societies. These centered on the ethical problem of ascribing virtue to the acquisition of wealth 
by the lending of money. More especially a ban on interest was common to all the ethical systems of 
the pre-modern world. It was based on Aristotle's unequivocal statement: "Usury is detested above 
all and for the best of reasons. It makes profit out of money itself, not for money's natural 
object...Money was intended as a means of exchange, not to increase at interest". (Aristotle, p.20-21) 
              This prohibition on interest was gradually lifted in the West. But, ethical worries about the 
'unreality' of credit and of the socially unproductive nature of interest resurfaced with a vengeance 
in 18th century England following the Financial Revolution of 1694-96, which created a vastly 
expanded credit mechanism, leading to the rise of the rentier. In J.g.a.Pocock’s words: "The stocks 
which were his title to a return upon the loans he had made became themselves a commodity, and 
their value was manipulated by a new class of stockjobbers." (Pocock (1975) p. 72) 
          In the ensuing Augustan debates, this posed a severe problem for  the traditional value system 
shared by both opponents and friends of the new goddess Credit. For the traditional ethical system 
"the moral foundation for civic virtue and moral personality is taken to be independence and real 
property" (ibid). 
 Property in the form of land was the most real asset , and though the trader and the merchant's 
wealth was moveable, and hence not as reliable in inducing civic virtue as assued by the landlord, it  
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did at least consist of real things. By contrast, the wealth of the stockholder and the stock jobber as 
created by the new system of public credit appeared to be unreal and fantastical: Again as Pocock 
puts its: 
     "When the commodities to be bought and sold were paper tokens of men's confidence in their 
rulers and one another, the concept of fantasy could more properly be applied, and could bear the 
meaning not only of illusion and imagination, but of men's opinions of others' opinions of them". 
(p.76) 
        This is a view of commerce and the speculation it necessarily engenders, which survives to our 
day in the outpourings of the various critics of global financial and capital markets. Lest it be 
thought to be the untutored prejudice of economic illiterates, one only has to remember Keynes' 
peroration on the stock market in his General Theory  (Keynes (1936) pp.155), , which clearly echoes 
the Augustan critique of commerce. 
  5.2 The State: 
      The atavistic material belief just described,  which was relevant in pre-modern agrarian 
economies but has no place in the set of material beliefs required for modernization. Equally atavistic 
are many of the other critiques of global capitalism by Western critics. To appreciate this, it is useful 
to outline the story that the English political philosopher Michael Oakeshott tells about the evolution 
of Western thought on the State. He makes a crucial distinction between the State viewed as a civil 
association, and  as an enterprise association.  Oakeshott notes that the view of the State as a civil 
association dates back to ancient Greece. At that time the State was seen as the custodian of laws 
which did not seek to impose any preferred pattern of  societal goals  (including abstractions such as 
the general (social) welfare, or fundamental rights), but which merely facilitated individuals to 
pursue their own ends.  This view has been challenged by the rival conception of the State as an 
enterprise association  a view which has its roots in the Judaeo 
Christian tradition.  In this tradition the State is  seen as the manager of an enterprise seeking to use 
the law for its own substantive purposes, and ,in particular for the legislation of morality.  The 
classical liberalism of Smith and Hume embraces the former view of the State , while the (later) 
socialists  viewed it as an enterprise association,  with a moral aim of  equalizing people. 
Oakeshott (1993) notes that, as in many other pre-industrial societies, modern Europe 
inherited a "morality of communal ties" from the Middle Ages.  From the 16th century onwards this 
was gradually superseded by a morality of individuality, whereby individuals came to value making 
their own choices "concerning activities, occupations, beliefs, opinions, duties and responsibilities" 
and also came to approve of this "self  determined conduct" in others.  This individualist morality 
was fostered by the gradual breakdown of the medieval order which allowed a growing number of 
people to escape from the corporate and communal organizational structure of medieval life. 
But this dissolution of communal ties also bred , a group of what Oakeshott terms the "anti 
individual". This group comprised individuals  who were unwilling or unable to make their own 
choices. Of this group some were resigned to their fate, but in others it provoked "envy, jealousy and 
resentment.  And in these emotions a new disposition was generated:  the impulse to escape from the 
predicament by imposing it upon all mankind" (p. 24)  This attempt to revert to the pre-industrial 
communalist  world by, the anti -individual took two forms.  The first was to look to the government 
to "protect him from the necessity of being an individual" (p. 25)  A large number of government 
activities from  the introduction of th Elizabethan Poor Laws in  the 16th century were devoted  "to 
the protection of those who, by circumstance or temperament, were unable to look after themselves 
in this world of crumbling communal ties" (p. 25) 
     The anti-individual, secondly, sought to escape his "feeling of guilt and inadequacy which his 
inability to embrace the morality of individuality provoked" (p. 25) by calling forth a "morality of 
collectivism", where "'security' is preferred to 'liberty', 'solidarity' to 'enterprise' and 'equality' to 
'self 
determination'" (p.  27).  This trend came became particularly important with the various socialist 
and collectivist movements of the 19
th century.  Both the individualist and collectivist moralities were 
different modifications of the earlier communal morality, but with the collectivist morality also being 
a reaction against the morality of individualism. 
This collectivist morality inevitably supported the view of the State as an enterprise 
association.  While this view dates back to antiquity, few if any pre-modern states were able to be 
"enterprising", as their resources were barely sufficient to undertake the basic tasks of government,  
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viz. law and order and external defense.  This changed with the creation of centralized "nation 
states" by the Renaissance princes and the subsequent Administrative Revolution of the 16
th century , 
a term which  Hicks (1969, p. 99) used to denote the gradual expansion of the tax base and increased 
span of control of the government over its subjects lives.  Governments now had the power to look 
upon their activities as an enterprise. 
Oakeshott (1993) identifies three versions of the collectivist morality such an enterprise 
association has since sought to enforce.  Since the truce declared in the 18th century in the European 
wars of religion, the major substantive purposes sought by States seen as enterprise associations are 
"nation 
building" and "the promotion of some form of egalitarianism".  These correspond to what Oakeshott 
(1993) calls the productivist and distributionist versions of the modern embodiments of the enterprise 
association, whose religious version was epitomized by Calvinist Geneva, and in our own times is 
provided by Khomeni's Iran.  Each of these collective forms conjures up some notion of perfection, 
believed to be "the common good". 
      In my view,  this Oakeshottian taxonomy allows us to think clearly about the links between ethics, 
economics and politics.  The fog created by distinctions like negative and positive liberty and 
continuing attempts to reconcile these irreconcilables, 
3 can be readily dispelled by keeping 
Oakeshott's distinction between these two interpretations of the State in mind. The State seen as a 
civil association does not seek to legislate morality. The State seen as an enterprise association does.  
The main difference between the first liberal international economic order (LIEO) established under 
British leadership in the 19
th century and the contemporary LIEO fostered by most Western 
governments is that, while the former embodied the classical liberal view of the State- viz. it did not 
seek to legislate morality- the latter  is infected by the enterprise view in both the domestic concerns 
for social welfare and the desire to export Western values like ‘human rights’ and ‘democracy’ to the 
Rest of the world.    
       This allows us to see that the desire by many current critics of globalization to use the State to 
legislate their preferred ethics is antithetical to the Western classical liberal tradition. It would take 
me too far afield to show why this  view of the world which seeks to combine the market with various 
 social demands is likely to be counterproductive. These socialist impulses as the above discussion 
should make clear are atavistic. The State should- as it can if it chooses- restrict itself to providing 
the public goods which are an essential part of the infrastructure for efficient globalization, leaving 
morality to the family and other institutions of civil society. 
    5.3 NGO's: 
         This brings us to the NGOs. It is not sufficiently appreciated that most  a e really pressure 
groups. (see Lal (1999), chp.4). As Mancur Olson has shown, rather than regard these as benign 
constituents of civil society a la Tocqueville and the American pluralist political science model, they 
are better seen as engaged in a redistributive political game to garner a larger share for sectional 
interests. They are now part of Oakeshott’s enterprise associations. Thus whereas in Victorian 
England, for instance, the NGO’s of those days- the largely charitable, religious and art based 
associations - were largely exercising a civic role which helped to provide the social cement of the 
society (see Himmelfarb (1995)), today many NGO’s are promoting their own, often, political ends.  
The international NGO's, it maybe argued, are altruistic as they are not seeking benefits for 
themselves but for mankind. They are promoting an international moral order and thence an 
international civil society. But in the three areas in which they are most active namely issues relating 
to labour standards, human rights and the environment, their attempts to enforce universal global 
standards is most likely to do great harm, particularly to the constituency in whose name they claim 
to speak - the world's poor-as I and others have argued on many an occasion. (see Lal (1988a), 
(2000a)). Moreover, as I have argued above there is no universal moral code, the morality that these 
'global salvationists', as David Henderson (2001) has labelled them, is nothing else but the culture-
specific, proselytizing, universal and egalitarian ethic of what remains at heart Western 
Christendom. Apart from the disorder this can cause as the Rest resist this Western ethical 
imperialism, it will also damage the prospects of the world's poor. 
                                                 
3 For instance by Sen (1992). That these two divergent views of the State cannot be reconciled by 
arguing as Sen does that classical liberals are also egalitarians as they are concern3d with the 
equality of liberty is cogently argued by Sugden (1993).   
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             Thus the environmental NGO's are in the vanguard in attempting to in effect stop growth 
(and the poverty alleviation it entails) in the Third World by seeking to limit their carbon 
emissions;(See Lal (1999) chp. 10)  the consumer NGO's are seeking to prevent imports of goods from 
developing countries produced by means which do not meet their moral standards, in the name of 
ethical trading; (see Lal (1998a) 
 the human rights NGO's are attempting to legislate a new extra-territorial principle based on 
western moral values categorized as 'human rights; (see Lal (2000)  the health NGO's have taken on 
a crusade against GM foods,which promise the same hope for the hungry of the world that the Green 
Revolution (which too was based on the genetic modification of plants) delivered in the last three 
decades. (see Lal (2000a)) 
              This attempt by the self-appointed to do good, as they see it, of course has historical 
parallels. (see Lal (1988)).  With the establishment of the British Raj and its policy of free trade, 
imports of cheap Lancashire textiles destroyed the Indian export trade in cotton textiles, and 
undoubtedly led to a reduction in employment in the domestic handloom industry, though not- as 
many nationalists and Marxists maintained - its total destruction. But, by 1850 a modern cotton 
textile industry was established based on Indian entrepreneurship and capital, and as it began 
exporting, in a few decades it had turned the tables on Lancashire. This led to repeated 
representations by the cotton-textile interests of Manchester to the Secretary of State for India "to 
apply British factory legislation en bloc to India so as to neutralize the 'unfair' advantages which the 
Indian mill industry was enjoying because of its large scale employment of child labor and long hours 
of work".(D.”Bhattacharya (1979),p.171) 
               They were supported in this by various well-meaning pressure groups. This led to the 
institution of the first of the Factory Acts of 1881, which had disastrous effects on the fortunes of the 
India textile industry and labor. By raising the effective price of labor they led to lower employment 
levels than would otherwise have occurred, and by hobbling the industry, made it inevitable that it 
too would ask  for protection from Japanese imports. This was granted and the outcome led to 
growing inefficiency in this pioneering industry in the Third World. So much so that, for the last 50 
years it has been one of India's sickest industries. Until today, these 19th century labor laws continue 
to harm both Indian industrial employment levels and efficiency. They have rightly been described 
by one historian as the result of agitation by "ignorant English philanthropists and grasping English 
manufacturers" (Bhattacharya, ibid). 
. But that is precisely the alliance we saw on the streets of Seattle at the 1999 WTO meeting - with the 
Americans replacing the English!      
                     Today these global salvationists are first, attempting to  engender what they call 
corporate social responsibility among multinationals. David Henderson (2001) provides a devastating 
critique of this millennial collectivism, as its claims that globalization has marginalised poor peoples 
and poor countries,  increased the power of multinational enterprises and reduced those of States are 
demonstrably false. 
              While its claim for a new tripartism between businesses, governments and selected NGO's - 
which has unfortunately been embraced by some businesses- "confers on businesses and NGO's alike 
a status which they have no rightful claim to, since they are neither elected nor politically 
accountable" . 
         The second tack, taken by the global salvationists, is an old trick that, for instance, Communist 
parties which could not win power through elections were wont to use- entryism. Having failed by 
and large- outside Germany and the Scandinavian countries- to win enough public support for their 
agenda in elections, the Greens are seeking to legislate it through the un-elected bureaucracies of the 
transnational institutions like UNEP, the World Bank, WHO and they hope through the WTO. Their 
aim is to push through international treaties and conventions sponsored by these organizations to 
regulate various aspects of the economies, particularly of the Third World. These supra national 
institutions, apart from the WTO, are thus now becoming party to the ethical imperialism being 
promoted by the global salvationists. (see Lal (2000a)).  So, unlike Dunning and many of the other 
authors in this book I do not think that, even though in the past many of these supra national 
institutions were in the vanguard of promoting the LIEO, today many of them instead of aiding 
globalization  are increasingly its enemy, promoting a global collectivism, which embodies the  
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'ethical' enterprise association view of the State adumbrated by Oakeshott. 
4 
     
 
  Conclusions: 
     My conclusions can be brief. To allow the gains from trade to be reaped and to reduce the 
'policing' type of transactions costs morality is needed to reign in opportunistic behaviour. But given 
that, as Hume saw so clearly, it is not necessary to invoke either God or Reason can justify any 
particular morality , the only source of morality must be local traditions which socialize children 
through the moral emotions of shame and guilt to 'be good'. Capitalism does require moral 
behaviour. But this cannot be enforced by States, NGO's or supra-national institutions. If one does 
want to strengthen morality it is important not to undermine its traditional mainsprings in the non 
Western part of the world in the name of a mistaken belief in a universal Western ethic. For, it is 
possible for countries to modernise (i.e embrace capitalism) without Westernising (i.e accepting the 
West's morality - its cosmological beliefs). In fact, if one looks at the non-Western world, the moral 
foundations of most- though by no means all- societies are still intact. It is in the West that there is 
growing doubt about its fractured and incoherent morality. Writing as a Hindu, it is not for me to 
preach about the ways in which the morality which is required for capitalism to function with 







                                                 
4 The argument that these supra national institutions are required to provide global public goods is 
discussed in Lal  (2000b) 
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.. For a game-theoretic account of how such a spontaneous order could have arisen see Sugden 
(1986). 
.. see Lal (1999) chp. 11 
..Matthews (1986), p.906. 
..see Colinvaux (1983). This was the definition adopted in Lal (1988) and in Lal (1998). 
. Hahn (1973) 
.see Hallpike (1986) 
.D.Lal (1997) 
.Hicks (1979), p. 43 
.see Berman (1983).  
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.Gellner (1988), p.121. 
.see Hallpike (1986), Jenner (1992) 
. Keightley (1990) p.45. 
. see De Bary (1998) and De Bary and Tu Weiming eds (1998) 
. Rosemont (1998), p.63. 
. Dumont (1986), p27 
.See Becker (1932) 
.A point only reiterated by reading the contributions in the edited volume by Sen and Williams. 
.That Freudianism follows the same narrative is argued by Gellner (1993) and Webster (1995). 
.se Lal (1995). 
. MacIntyre (1990). 
.the following is based on Lal (1985) 
.Aristotle: Politics, Everyman edtn, pp.20-21 
.Pocock (1975a),p.72 
.ibid, p.76 
.Keynes (1936), pp. 155 and following 
.Sugden in his review of Sen, makes much the same distinction between the two divergent views of 
public policy embodied in the technocratic "market failure" school and those of the neo-Austrians 
and the Virginia public choice school. 
.For instance by Sen and his followers.  That they cannot be reconciled in the way Sen(1992) 
proposes by arguing that, classical liberals too are egalitarians as they are concerned with the 
equality of liberty is cogently outlined by Sugden (1993). 
. see Lal (1999) chp. 4 for a critical discussion of the claim that NGO's are a benign manifestation of 
an international civil society. 
.see Lal (1999), chp.10. 
.see Lal (1998a) 
. see Lal (2000) 
.see Lal (2000 a) 
.The following is based on Lal (1988). 
.D.Bhattacharya (1979), p.171 
.the deleterious effects of this on the Third World are outlined in terms of the Kyoto protocol, the 
Biodiversity convention, the Basle convention, the POPs treaty in Lal (2000), which also shows how 
their local allies - what the Chinese used to 'rice christians'- have taken over 'environmental' 
ministries in developing countries which have often signed these treaties on their countries behalf 
without for instance the economic ministries, let alone the general public knowing what has been 
signed on their behalf.   
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.on the reason why the World Bank and IMF have now passed their sell by dates see Lal (1999) 
Chp.9, and Lal (2001) 
.the argument that these supra national institutions are required to provide global public goods is 
discussed in Lal (2000b).  
 
 
 
 